### 1nc short

#### Interpretation and violation --- the affirmative should defend the desirability of topical government action.

#### The agent and verb of the resolution indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb **should**—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, **should adopt** here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties with a target country.

Çelik 11 – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "*It is a policy of* deliberate expanding economic ties *with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations* ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " *the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction*.

#### Vote negative --- their failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential.

#### A) Limits --- debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis --- that’s key to avoid devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity.

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an **essential prerequisite** of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate **cannot** produce effective decisions without **clear identification of a question** or questions **to be answered**. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular questionand identification of a **line demarcating sides** in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an **understand**ing about **the objec­tive of the debate**. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. **Vague understanding** results in **unfocused deliberation** and **poor deci­sions**, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourseand guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually **unproductive** to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides **essential guidance** for the **preparation** of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a **concrete solution step.** One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides **better depth of argumentation** and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by **directing and placing limits on the decision to be made**, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It **is** still **too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is **best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill --- key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public **debate was robust** as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical **decision making, as do our school, community, and social** organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it **and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated.** The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability tothink critically.Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate **its relative** validity and strength**,** And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message underconsider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a **prerequisite** to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving **uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets.** Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary **research confirms the value of debate**. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. **Our success or failure in life is** largely **determined** by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the **thousands** of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

#### B) Fairness --- our argument is not a rule --- it’s an expression that what the aff said was not fair to the negative --- we have been excluded from active participation in this debate --- you’re voting against the aff for being a type of politics that doesn’t care about their opponents, which is crucial to the success of ideas. We should understand fairness as a form of agnostic politics.

**Hatab 2**, Prof of Philosophy @ Old Dominion University, (Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily **underwrite political principles of fairness.** Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve **demands an able opponent**. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be **able adversaries**, **that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest.** And I should be able to honor the winner of a **fair contest**. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even **include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants.** [25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT25) In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and **affirm our opponents as worthy competitors** [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a **dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation**, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as **competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights,** not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, **procedural notion** conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.

#### C) Truth-testing --- dialogic partners need to acknowledge the fact that we share a shared world --- this doesn’t imply consensus or shared values. But it means we need to be able to understand how what they have said affects us and vice versa.

**Hauser 06**

Gerad Hauser, 2006 (Professor of Communication and the University of Colorado Boulder. His research is in the relation between formal and vernacular rhetoric as they shape and are shaped by public spheres, "Vernacular dialogue and the rhetoricality of public opinion."

The complementarity of I and we does not mean that there is a convergence of opinion among dialogic partners, only that they **inhabit a common world of concerns** that requires them to take account of one another while arriving at judgments. Extrapolating from Taylor's analysis of the atomic I and molecular we of face-to-face dialogue to the more complex multilogue from which a public emerges, the same requirement of complementarity holds. The countless acts of publicly expressed opinions on contingent affairs requires the type of social cooperation- **even in opposition**—that occurs only when participants read the expressions of **others with a degree of accuracy** that permits them to ascertain their relevance to and consequences for themselves and, more importantly, the social world they share. Common understanding of this sort would be **impossible without a language of common meanings**. An ensemble of individuals referred to as a "public" is, when unconstrained, liable to the contentious behaviors of factions who differ in opinions and interests, as Madison's Publius warned in Federalist no. 10. **A public is not necessarily a group in consensus**. The supporters of New Democracy who had demonstrated in Sindagma square the week before the Greek election doubtless had internal differences over their political and economic concerns; surely their interests diverged from their partisan countrymen and women in the rural regions, the mountains to the north, and the islands dotting the Aegean. They were manifesting every sign of deep division from their counter parts supporting PASOK, **but they were not unintelligible to one another** as they sometimes were to American eyes and ears illiterate in Greek politics and political conventions. The thesis that human reality is socially constructed is by now almost an academic commonplace. Its widespread acceptance, however, does not alter its importance for understanding the extent to which the language available to a people determines **the social world they share.** For an ensemble of strangers to have a common understanding of reality requires more than a common language permitting intersubjective understanding. Common understanding **entails a language** that applies to a common reference world, **even when our customs, preferences, and methods pertaining to that world are at odds.** The bond of common meaning is not shared values and meanings but the **sharing of the shared world**, commonly understood even if differently lived (Taylor, 1971).

#### Linking the ballot to a should question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences andphilosophical values into a course of action --- debate is a process, not a product

**Hanghoj 08** Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of **educational gaming** cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. **Dramatic rehearsal** The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by **projecting** and **choosing between** various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (**in imagination**) of various competing possible **lines of action**… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “**possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment**. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding **everyday rationality** (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “**thought experiment**” will be successful. **But what it can do** is make the **process** of choosing more **intelligent** than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to **inquire into** and resolve **scenario-specific problems** (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a **striking difference** between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the **actual consequences** that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or **simulate** the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “**competing** possible **lines of action**” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving **the “right” answers, but** more a question of exploring the **contingent outcomes** and **domain-specific processes** of **problem-based scenarios**.

### case

#### The standing reserve argument is a slipper slope fallacy – denies individual freedom and turns the case

Wolcher 05

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But this account of Kants blindness to temporality tells us why he was blind - it does not yet tell us how the event of making-blind occurred. Let us therefore ask how, exactly, does any particular 'A => B' enslave those who announce and believe in it? More generally, what is it about believing in idea 'X' (or Tiaving' it in Heidegger's sense of a fore-having) that entails anything whatsoever? These questions suggest the hypothesis that Heidegger may have unreasonably denied his predecessors the very gift of freedom that he acknowledged in himself and, moreover, that in doing so he relied on a sort of crude formalism, according to which the A of a philosopher's belief in 'A => B' necessarily leads to (=>) the B of his or her thinking, writing and other comportment. By way of evidence for this hypothesis, consider the following passage, in which Heidegger explains why metaphysics thinks in terms of a 'highest being', rather than experiencing being as such:¶ Metaphysics has this character because it is what it is: the representation of beings as beings. Metaphysics has no choice. As metaphysics, U is by its very essence excluded from the experience of Being; for it always represents beings only with an eye to that aspect of them that has already manifested itself as beings. (1998:288)¶ On its face, this text seems to claim that when metaphysics asserts 'A (the highest being) => B (other beings)', this very way of thinking and talking compels people to ignore being as such, and compels them to slide down a slippery slope towards the vacuity of technological thinking and its construction of a soulless world in the form of a standing reserve of useful matter. The best analogy to this thesis of necessity comes from the sphere of legal theory. The statement 'metaphysics has no choke' is akin to the formalist assertion that words like 'due process' automatically produce their correct interpretation (and proscribe all incorrect interpretations), or that the word 'white' in a contract could never, under any circumstances, be rightly interpreted to mean black. It is important to understand that neither legal formalism nor Heidegger place that which they think determines human behaviour into the category of psychology, for legal formalism, legal texts are metaphysically related to their correct interpretations; and for Heidegger, our fore-havings and fore-conceptions are ontological determinations of our being-in-the-world, and therefore¶ prior to all merely 'founded' modes of explanation, such as psychology. Science explains why and how A leads to B in terms of causal mechanisms and statistical probabilities: not so legal formalism and Heidegger. This makes Heidegger's assertion that 'metaphysics has no choice' all the more puzzling: if believing in or having this or that version of 'A => B' leaves metaphysics no choice, and if this phenomenon of being-left-no-choice is not to be explained causally, men how does 'A => B' perform its dark magic? How does it manage to eclipse human freedom?¶ If the above-quoted passage on metaphysics and necessity were an outlier - an isolated instance of hyperbole on Heidegger's part - then it would be both possible and appropriate to overlook it. But the passage does not stand alone. Countless other similarly worded passages, of like import, are scattered like autumn leaves throughout his oeuvre. Here are just a few of them, by way of illustration:¶ • 'Calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master everything on the basis of the consequential correctness of its procedure' (1998:235)¶ • 'Every science adheres only to the penultimate and must presuppose the ultimate as first' (1992a: 160)¶ • 'Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it' (1977:6)¶ • 'Enframing (Ge-stett) challenges itself forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the essence of truth' (1977:33)¶ 'The still hidden truth of Being is withheld from metaphysical humanity. The labouring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness' (2003a: 87)¶ 'The tradition of the truth about beings, which goes under the title "metaphysics", develops into a pile of distortions, no longer recognising itself, covering up the primordial essence of Being' (2003a: 19)¶ 'Being as presencing in the sense of calculable material... claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of mis determination of Being' (1972:7)¶ 'Metaphysics, insofar as it always represents beings as beings, does not recall Being itself' (Kaufmann 1956:208)¶ 'Being has brought it to pass in history that there is nothing to Being itself (1991: IV, 222)¶ The primordial problem of ground cannot be conceived on the basis of propositional truth' (1984:128)¶ • In the history of metaphysics "being" is always grasped as beingness of beings and thus as these beings themselves' (1999a: 177)¶ • Representational thought 'cannot overcome Descartes, nor even rise up against him, for how shall the consequence ever attack the ground on which it stands?' (1977:148)¶ After reading these and other similar passages, one almost wishes one could bring Heidegger back to life and ask him to recall his conception of freedom as the taking and the giving of grounds. Whatever happened to this glorious freedom, and where did its 'giving' part go during the dismal history of being conceived as the history of metaphysics? Was freedom during the age of metaphysics like a Xerox machine, exactly reproducing the thought 'A => B' indefinitely, until some 'great thinker' came along who somehow managed to create a new image of A ^ B, which freedom then chose to copy for a long while until it was replaced, and so on and so on, down to the present day?¶ These questions bring to mind Derrida's influential critique of structuralism in social theory and philosophy: the thought that structure necessitates social life seems to deny all possibility of change through 'play\* (Kamuf 1991: vii-viii). Could it be that Heidegger was a closet or unconscious structuralist, despite the fact that he derided any philosophy which stops short of being as such as but 'an unattached shifting around in concepts as mere signs'? (1985: 65). Could it really be the case that Heidegger thought that the 'A => B' which characterised any particular era during the long history of metaphysics necessarily entailed the behaviours of those who internalised it as the self-evident truth, entailed that this particular ground led to its world in the way that '1 +1' leads to '27¶ I am using the word 'entailed' quite carefully here, for despite his obvious sensitivity to historicity and the indeterminacy of language, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics betrays the belief, at least at some level, that something important depends and must depend on the way people talk and think. I say this not just because of the material quoted earlier, but because of a thought experiment that I have performed many times, and that I invite you to perform. I imagine taking Heidegger to a world that cannot help but gratify and please in every respect - a world without pain or suffering, for example, full of genuine joy and satisfaction, where people always treat both nature and one another with enormous respect, compassion and love, and where no one has ever heard of war, genocide, cruelty and environmental degradation. In this world, rivers such as Holderlin's Der Ister sparkle and shine in people's lives in a way that would please Heidegger even during his most pernickety and poetic moods (1996a). The main problem is that all of the people in this world (except Heidegger, of course) talk and have always talked like vulgar yokels, in terms of representation, either/or, and the metaphysics of presence. Phrases such as 'the worldhood of the world' (1962:¶ 24) mean nothing to these people: for them, the world is the earth, a thing is just a thing, and an appropriation is what their legislature does when it votes to allocate funds. Every now and then, however, these people do ask themselves 'Why is there something rather than nothing?', after which they always have a faraway look on their faces and exclaim 'Wow!', without further comment. In other words, the people in this world experience the wonder of being as such without ever feeling the need to think it¶ I have to admit it: when I run this thought experiment, I almost always see Heidegger having a massive nervous breakdown from irresolvable cognitive dissonance. I am referring to the kind of dissonance that I imagine would spring up in him after he observed the utter absence of any apparent relation of 'leading to' (^) between these people's manner of speaking and thinking (A) and the shape of the world in which they live (B). Unless he believed in the order-giving comfort of something like a causal nexus between language and world, why did the early Heidegger, for example, think that traditional ontology had 'covered up' the question of Being, and why did he think that the¶ destruction (Destruktiort) of the history of ontology was worth doing at all? (1962: 44). And why did the later Heidegger think that calculative thinking 'compels itself' to mastery of the world? (1998:235). and our actions has always struck me as drawing a useful antithesis to our deeply ingrained prejudice that ways of talking and thinking really do and must matter: 'certainly our opinions, valuations, and tables of goods are among the most powerful gears in the clockwork of our actions', he wrote, 'but in every particular case the law of tlieir mechanism is unprovable' (Nietzsche 1995: 335). Although Heidegger knew this too, I am not speaking of merely 'knowing' something here, but rather of a tendency that lies buried deep in all of the ways of Western thought: the tendency to think that if the abstraction A is counted as 'true', then belief in the abstraction must lead to concrete outcome B.¶ Although he probably did not recognise this tendency in himself, Heidegger would undoubtedly have agreed that as a general matter the tendency to find a 'hardwired' connection between beings remains stuck at a level of thinking that is not yet mature. 'Mature' (ie Heideggerian) thought recognises that all necessity is grounded in unity - A cannot 'compel' 8 unless A is stable enough to be described as a unity resting in itself. Nietzsche's trenchant remark on the absence of a provable link between our opinions

#### individual action is crucial to overcoming violent paranoia---the aff causes meaningless nihilism

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Various psychological factors have been proposed for explaining why climate change is a difficult issue for individuals, societies and institutions to mitigate against it or take remedial actions (Rachlinski, 2000), focusing on a wide range of cognitive heuristics and biases (see, for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gardner and Stern, 1996). However, in this section, **we** shall re-**examine perception** and **responses to climate change in relation to the** existential anxieties **which underlie human perception**, as a complementary rather than conflicting taxonomy to that of cognitive bias. We shall achieve this using data from semi-structured interviews, focus groups and a survey on perceptions of global climate in Norwich, UK (Lorenzoni et al., 2001; Langford and Lorenzoni, 2001).

One frequently cited cognitive heuristic is that of biased assimilation, or the selective collection or evaluation of new information to support previously held beliefs, and ensuring their consistency and continuation (Festinger, 1957; Greenwald, 1980), sometimes referred to as maintenance of ‘attitudinal certainties’ (Eiser, 1994). With respect to climate change (and other major environmental threats), this often results in polarization of opinion – into regarding the threat as the most important thing in the world, or complete rejection of it as trivial and due to ‘media hype’ (Langford et al., 1999b). In our semi-structured interviews, we also found a range of opinions which we managed to also retrieve from a factor analysis of the survey data (Figure 1), based around two axes of belief in human impacts on climate change, and concern/importance value of climate change. The four strategies can be characterized as follows in existential terms:

**Denial**: these **people refused to acknowledge that climate change was an important issue**, and also registered low interest and concern in the issue. How- ever, as became clear in the focus groups, this was not a passive position, but an active. Participants showed strong individualistic and/or hierarchist tendencies (Langford et al., 2000a; Marris et al., 1998; Langford et al., 1999b) placing their reason at the centre of their worlds, believing in their ability to be well informed and make realistic judgements based on this information. Their defense against uncertainty and the possibility of disaster lay in the realm ofpersonal specialness. They defined themselves as being reasoning people, largely by lamenting the ignorance and passive behaviors of others, the ‘people who go shopping in the city centre on Saturdays’. They were keenly interested in social issues, and there was a consensus that everybody should be forced to vote by law, to make them responsible for Government – personal responsibility was another very strong line taken in defining the efficacy of the self. When presented with graphical and textual information on climate change, they found it useful, but questioned where it had come from, and how reliable it was supposed to be. Rationality took the uncertainty out of life – as one participant commented, there had been major environmental scares, and prophecies of doom in the 1970s and 1980s, but the world was still very much as it had been. Because today followed from yesterday, tomorrow would follow in its own fairly predictable manner. The rationality defense was particularly effective, as it allowed for a sense of superiority over both the emotional responses which environmentalists were labelled with and the ignorance of the common citizen/consumer. Although the facts the participants stated were not always correct, they prided themselves on being open to new information and capable of forming their own opinions, given sufficient evidence. Personal responsibility was seen as being paramount, and the lack of it in others was used as a comforting explanation of the inherent uncertainty in the world – if everyone behaved responsibly, then things would be predictable. Scientific uncertainty, in particular over climate change, was seen as a weakness, and also as being divisive, in the sense that scientists set themselves up as experts, but then cannot provide definitive evidence.

**Disinterest**: these people presented themselves as having a generally fatalistic view on life (Langford et al., 2000), believing that external forces beyond their control exert unmanageable influence over their lives. In social learning theory terms, these people have an external locus of control, believing that powerful others, fate and chance dominate their experiences (Langford et al., 2000b; Bandura, 1986; Wallston, 1992; Rotter, 1966). In interviews and focus groups, these respondents were very cautious about believing anything, and **talked only about the negative impacts of humans on the environment and each other**. **They** possessed neither the personal specialness or ultimate rescuer defenses to any degree, and **were lacking in finding true meaning in the world or even their own lives.** Some could be described as ‘vegetative’, and **it was difficult** to motivate them to attend a group discussion, as has previously been found with ‘fatalists’ (Langford et al., 2000a). Some, when provoked into discussion, became more actively nihilistic, and **presented angry and fearful discourses** on the vested interests of both government and industry colluding together in aggressive global capitalism which destroyed both the environment and the meaning- fulness of people’s lives. When questioned about possible future impacts of climate change in 50 years time, participants denied any responsibility, stating it 14 was not their problem, and they would not be involved, so they didn’t want to think about it. These respondents also felt themselves isolated, but did not define this anxiety in terms of self and other, instead relying on the more general defense that the world is basically a bad place, and we can do very little to change this. ‘Connectedness’ was only present in the sense that we are all victims of powerful, impersonal political and economic forces. They felt that ‘world markets’ (or global capitalism) was both the present and the future for the world and, whilst ‘global sustainability’ would be a better option, it was too ‘utopian’, and only very major catastrophes occurring directly to those in power would precipitate any change – such as ‘major floods right in the centre of London’. Again, change was only seen as occurring through chance events happening to those who hold the power.

Willing and Keen: those who fell into this broad category **felt themselves to be empowered, and showed high levels of concern and** information gathering. However, in contrast to those in the ‘denial’ category, **their responses were far more affective than cognitive** (Langford and McDonald, 1997), and they preferred to use feeling and intuition to justify their opinions than rational- ization and categorization. They generally had a belief in some sort of ‘ultimately rescuing’ principle, or basically, that if enough effort is put in, and commitment shown, then the ‘good guys can win’. Those who were ‘keen’ **showed a high degree of** personal **responsibility, and believed in their obligation to ‘do the right thing’** personally, with individual action being ideally complemented by political leadership. They were less judgmental of other people, and defined the distinction between ‘self’ and ‘others’ in terms of motivation and knowledge. There was some evidence of crusadism, and the need to convert others to their way of thinking, which was non-critically assumed to be "good for everybody, and the planet" They linked together human actions and environ- mental impacts, and believed that freedom creates responsibility. In contrast, those who could be classified as ‘willing’ demonstrated more negative attitudes towards the role of others, and more pessimism about the future. In general, **people were highly anxious about uncertainty,** but rationalized this anxiety through believing that commitment, effort and educating others could create a better world. They prided themselves on having a social as well as environ- mental conscience, but were fearful of the future, due to the uncertainty surrounding technological advancement, which was taking things further and further away from the ‘natural’ at a faster and faster pace. This fear of un- certainty caused the ‘willing’ to lose some motivation for taking action based on their beliefs, but the ‘keen’ focused on using collective effort to bring about change in both businesses and government. Overall, fears of death, groundless- ness and meaninglessness were assuaged by a belief in communal efficacy linked to the possibility of social change based on education and political pressure.

#### Death is bad

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Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject **—** it is the ultimate in etaphysical lightening strikes**.** 80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives**.** Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about**,** a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interferencewith the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.

#### Voting aff doesn’t affirm excess or sovereignty---they only cause self-indulgent babble

Paul Mann 99, Literature prof @ Pomona, 1999, Masocriticism, p. 67-69

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.’4 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a ‘Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his ‘Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or dépensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is the nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.

#### Their focus on crafting the self is the politics of fascism --- outwardly focused democratic participation and consequentialism are key

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For Benjamin, the paradox was that what he called ‘the age of mechanical reproduction’, rather than fulfilling its “natural” mission of freeing people from the chains of an enchanted vision of the world - one that made people feel miniscule and in awe of authority - ended up instead becoming an instrument of domination. Liberation was countered by submission. Freed from the dogma of the Church and other institutions, thanks to the availability of information and new technologies, the so-called masses were nevertheless prey to re-enchantment, especially through new charismatic styles of politics that fed off myths and rituals: the case of Mussolini’s Italy (and, of course, Nazi Germany too). This idea of “anaesthetized aesthetics,” to use an expression by Susan Buck-Morss, perfectly captures Mussolini’s approach to politics and his role in the government of the polity. How was his politics anaesthetic? In my research of Mussolini’s writings and speeches, the trope of the politician as artist emerged as one of the strongest and most frequent, and not as a mere formula or superficial reference but as a core feature of Mussolini’s own understanding of politics. In Mussolini’s view, for politics not to be a dirty word that reflected the failing political class’s capacity for endless debates and conservative behaviour, it had to play a role much more active and daring; politics was supposed to change a society’s whole way of living and thinking. The issue was not one of mere shifts in government: the old game of political compromises and formulas. With fascism, the goal was to revolutionize the meaning of politics itself in order to construct a new Italy on the ruins of the old one. Here is where the idea of the politician as artist comes in. The artist politician destroys in order to create. “Moulding,” “sculpting,” and “shaping” were terms that became familiar in Mussolini’s discourse when he referred to the masses and their transformation into ideal fascist models. Politics was an art for Mussolini, and he liked to think of himself as a sculptor who alone could render hard material into malleable constructions, pliable artifacts. Is there anything more radical in terms of disregard for people, or more opposed to the rules of democratic participation, than this approach that considers people as things? - an approach that in my opinion overlaps with and defines totalitarianism. The second element of fascism’s aesthetic politics was the expressive means employed by Mussolini, as a result of his underpinning idea of a disciplined, organized harmonious "aesthetic" form that is supposed to define the whole of Italian society under fascism - to actualize his role as artist politician. This is certainly the more familiar, visually evident, and even at times caricatured aspect of fascism’s aesthetic politics. It encompasses the plethora of rituals and symbols, which attracted the attention of many, including Hitler as well as Stalin, especially during the early years of the regime. In part the natural outcome of a movement that wanted to distinguish itself from traditional politics, in part a reflection of the youthful character of its members, and in part an expression of cultural trends of the time, fascism emerged as a semiotically rich phenomenon. Uniforms of adherents, although not colourful, were distinctive; ritualistic ceremonies and gestures identified the special nature of the group; myths framed the cultural horizon of its followers, and so on and so forth. Such semiotic excess did not merely emerge at the origins of the movement, but continued to be augmented over time with new or newly redefined symbolic means. Their importance within the regime increased, at times exponentially, such as in the case of the Roman salute or the goose step, and of course of the myth of Mussolini, which was at the centre of this highly orchestrated ritualistic apparatus. Though shifting in style and focus over the years, Mussolini’s centrality in the fascist constellation remained unchallenged, unsurpassed, and ever growing indeed, gaining traction also thanks to the ability of the media to diffuse Mussolini’s image via the printed press, cinema, and the radio. From lion tamer to rural worker, motorcyclist, father, commander, Mussolini’s figure affirmed fascism’s value and helped build fascism as a longstanding regime. Two decades – not an insignificant stretch of time. A new Italian man This leads me to the last element of my discussion: the effectiveness of Mussolini’s aesthetic approach to politics. The question is tricky because there is no exact way to know the answer. What motivates me to raise this issue is however not so much the desire to find definite answers but the need to emphasize once again that Mussolini’s deep subscription to an aestheticized understanding of politics led him to play down, or not necessarily focus on, the outcome of his approach. Mussolini believed that the goal of remaking the Italians would naturally be attained. It was not an issue of if or how. Changes in the Italians’ gestures, rituals, ways of speaking, writing, etc. would necessarily bring about the change Mussolini was pursuing: a new Italian man would be born out of this artistic endeavour. Mussolini had undeniable faith in this project and was not very rational about it, I would underline, which again demonstrates the radical nature of his subscription to an aesthetic understanding of politics. More strategic objectives often took a back seat in his agenda, something that in different ways we find typical of the other totalitarian experiments in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Aesthetic goals were absolute and independent of any ethical issues.

#### The solution is to focus on political engagement

Zamponi 12—professor of sociology, UC Santa Barbra (SIMONETTA FALASCA-ZAMPONI, The politics of aesthetics: Mussolini and fascist Italy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/simonetta-falasca-zamponi/politics-of-aesthetics-mussolini-and-fascist-italy)

This article is the first in an occasional series on ‘The Political Aesthetics of Power and Protest,’ the subject of a one-day workshop held at the University of Warwick this September. Democracy, since it does not function through command or coercion, requires instead a constant renewal of sets of symbols - symbols which appeal to people and instil in them a sense of belonging and identification. Increasing disenchantment and disillusion with the state, with political institutions, their practices and performance, makes it more important to explore the place of this aestheticisation of political language, the aesthetics of protest as well as of power. Power has forever been entwined with a symbolic apparatus in charge of representing it. From Louis the XIV in France to Queen Victoria in England, images and rituals have served to strengthen people’s connections to governing institutions; symbols and rites make power more tangible and appealing. In the eighteenth century there also emerged a whole philosophical movement that argued that beauty could articulate political morality. Beauty was supposed to motivate people’s actions with the indirect result of guiding them towards the common good. As aesthetics slowly became entangled with politics, competing interpretations of how this relationship should unfold came to the fore. Eventually beauty was conceived instrumentally, reduced to style, and devoid of content. Fascism was one of the first movements to take advantage of aesthetics’ original radical political impulse while also simplifying its moral reach. Mussolini’s approach to politics is an extreme example of the degrading process aesthetics underwent at the turn of the twentieth century, a most perniciously successful implementation of the aestheticization of politics. As several scholars have argued, the concept of autonomous, disinterested art emerged as the result of a complex historical process originating in the eighteenth century in Britain. At the time, moralists of the calibre of Addison, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Alison set out to address the impact of egoism and instrumentality on ethical questions. Lord Shaftesbury, in particular, developed a notion of disinterestedness, at first linked to moral issues. Later disinterestedness became the core concept of modern aesthetic theory and the key methodological principle in the newly emerging discipline of aesthetics. Shaftesbury was opposed to the idea of considering ethics in terms of an action’s consequences, i.e., whether or not the action had positive effects on the common good. He argued that disinterestedness served to overcome what he considered the false choice between egoism and altruism; disinterestedness implied that moral life was not concerned with action but instead was fundamentally concerned with harmony and contemplation. Within this framework, virtuous “man” was like an art lover, and virtue was not about making the right decisions in order to reach worthy ends; rather, it stood for “no other than the love of order and beauty.” At first preoccupied with moral issues, over time Shaftesbury turned his ethical concerns into an aesthetically informed theory that emphasized the importance of beauty and contemplation when defining a virtuous person. Thus, whereas he had originally discussed disinterest in opposition to interest in practical actions, Shaftesbury later employed disinterest to refer to the “virtuous man” as a spectator keen on contemplating the beauty of both manners and morals. Disinterestedness was contrary to action and also dismissive of the desire to possess or use a thing; it emphasized the perceiving act when contemplating an object rather than the object being contemplated. Disinterestedness was connected with aesthetics rather than ethics, and emphasis was increasingly placed on the recipients’ experience and their capacity to contemplate an object. As long as one remained a spectator, one’s experience of an object would supposedly be disinterested because it was based solely on perception. The perceptual experience of beauty was then emphasized rather than the qualities that made a thing beautiful. This new perspective on experience marked the birth of aesthetics as a distinctive realm. Good taste Eventually, “good taste” was adopted as an evaluative tool and linked to the pleasure of the imagination and lack of desire for possessions. In Germany, judgment of taste became central to Kant’s influential redefinition of aesthetic essence and came to be identified by Kant with the human ability to share experiences in comparison to animals. For Kant, disinterestedness in aesthetic judgment signified that taste, though subjective because based on feelings rather than concepts, was not arbitrary or private. It involved, at least in principle, the existence of what he called a sensus communis, or common sense, intended not in the ordinary meaning of simple but rather in the sense of shared. Aesthetic judgment for Kant required consensual understanding within a collectivity. Thus, on the one hand, disinterestedness implied that the crucial factor in our experience of a beautiful object was not the object itself but the feelings of enjoyment it aroused in us. On the other hand, through reference to sensus communis, disinterestedness also implied that those feelings, being in principle communicable and inter-subjective, were not based on personal or sensual gratification and did not implicate a utilitarian dimension. Kant’s famous definition of art as “purposiveness without purpose” helped solidify the identification of the aesthetic realm with non-instrumental ends. For Kant, this did not mean that art should be disconnected from social life. In contrast, art provided an ideal space within which to envision a public forum away from concrete political or governmental action and where enlightened citizens could freely discuss political issues. Art was a self-proclaimed non-political space in which politics, however, worked as a motivational engine. In this sense, although seemingly founded on separation, modern aesthetics originated in relation to politics, domesticating the masses, with all their desires and impulses and winning them to democratic politics. Mussolini’s concept of power How is all this discussion of aesthetics connected to Mussolini and to the centrality of aesthetics in Mussolini’s conception and exercise of power? What do I mean by “conception of” power? In my view, Mussolini’s subscription to aesthetics ensured that symbols, art and rituals were all seen as contributing to a transformative, moulding power. They deeply informed how Mussolini conceived and exercised power. Mussolini subscribed to the notion of aesthetics promoted by the art for art’s sake movement, that is, the notion of art as autonomous and self-referential and detached from worldly matters. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, Mussolini had a great intuition about the crucial role of affect in politics, an intuition that, combined with his approach to aesthetics, gave way to the strange and lethal alchemy that we know of as fascism. Walter Benjamin was the first to associate fascism with an aesthetic approach to politics – an approach that he saw as representative of modern antinomies. The evocative and disturbing image Benjamin conjured to make his argument was the comparison of bombed-out sites in Ethiopia to blooming flowers – a comparison drawn by the leader of the Futurist avant-garde movement, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, from the height of the flying plane dropping those bombs during Italy’s colonial war. For Benjamin, such an image implied an aestheticized view of violence and war, of destruction and pain, an artistic transfiguration that overcame bodily material reality. Benjamin argued that the deadening of sense perception reflected in the image of blooming flowers instead of mangled Ethiopian bodies paradoxically ensued from a heightened sensitivity to which modern life’s fast pace subjected its dwellers. For example, the shock experienced in combat is transformed and sublated via the remote perspective from high in the sky and out of the mechanical invention of the time, the airplane.

#### Seeking to change the world is a celebration of life not a negation

Todd May 5, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531

And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both.

## 2nc

#### they treat the ballot as an opinion poll, an external fixture by which we can measure our ethicality --- this makes us endlessly obsessed with observing ourselves. Instead, you should evacuate meaning in the ballot.

**Baudrillard 85** – Jean, “The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media,” Literary History, Vol. 16, No. 3, On Writing Histories of Literature (Spring, 1985), pp. 577-589, JSTOR)//a-berg

This is our destiny, subjected to opinion polls, information, publicity, statistics: constantly confronted with the anticipated **statistical verification of our behavior**, absorbed by this permanent refraction of our least movements, we are no longer confronted with our own will. We are no longer even alienated, because for that it is necessary for the subject to be divided in itself, confronted with the other, contradictory. Now, where there is no other, the scene of the other, like that of politics and of society, has disappeared. Each individual is forced despite himself into the **undivided coherency of statistics**. There is in this a positive absorption into the transparency of computers, which is something worse than alienation. There is an obscenity in the functioning and the omnipresence of opinion polls as in that of publicity. Not because they might betray the secret of an opinion, the intimacy of a will, or because they might violate some unwritten law of the private being, but because they exhibit this **redundancy of the social**, this sort of **continual voyeurism** of the group in relation to itself: it must at all times know what it wants, know what it thinks, be told about its least needs, its least quivers, see itself continually on the videoscreen of statistics, constantly watch its own temperature chart, **in a** sort of **hypochondriacal madness**. The social becomes **obsessed with itself;** through this autoinformation, this **permanent autointoxication, it becomes its own vice, its own perversion**. This is the real obscenity. Through this feedback, this incessant anticipated accounting, the social loses its own scene. It no longer enacts itself; it has no more time to enact itself; it no longer occupies a particular space, public or political; it becomes confused with its own control screen. Overinformed, it develops ingrowing obesity. For everything which loses its scene (like the obese body) becomes for that very reason ob-scene. The silence of the masses is also in a sense obscene. For the masses are also made of this useless hyperinformation which claims to enlighten them, when all it does is clutter up the space of the representable and annul itself in a silent equivalence. And we cannot do much against this obscene circularity of the masses and of information. The two phenomena fit one another: the masses have no opinion and information does not inform them. Both of them, lacking a scene where the meaning of the social can be enacted, con-tinue to feed one another monstrously-as the speed with which information revolves increases continually the weight of the masses as such, and not their self-awareness. So if one takes opinion polls, and the uncertainty which they induce about the principle of social reality, and the type of obscenity, of **statistical pornography** to which they attract us-**if we take all that seriously**, if we confront all that with the claimed finalities of information and of the social itself, then it all seems very dramatic. But there is another way of taking things. It does not shed much more credit on opinion polls, but it restores a sort of status to them, in terms of **derision and of play**. § Marked 23:37 § In effect we can consider the indecisiveness of their results, the uncertainty of their effects, and their unconscious humor, which is rather similar to that of meteorology (for example, the possibility of verifying at the same time contradictory facts or tendencies), or again the casual way in which everybody uses them, disagreeing with them privately and especially if they verify exactly one's own behavior (no one accepts a perfect statistical evaluation of his chances). That is the real problem of the credibility accorded to them. Statistics, as an objective computation of probabilities, obviously eliminate any elective chance and any personal destiny. That is why, **deep down, none of us believes in them**, any more than the gambler believes in chance, but only in Luck (with a capital, the equivalent of Grace, not the other, which is the equivalent of probability). An amusing example of this obstinate denial of statistical chance is given by this news item: "If this will reassure you, we have calculated that, of every 50 people who catch the metro twice a day for 60 years, only one is in danger of being attacked. Now there is no reason why it should be you!" The beauty of statistics is never in their objectivity but in their involuntary humor. So if one takes opinion polls in this way, one can conceive that **they could work for the masses themselves as a game, as a spectacle, as a means of deriding both the social and the political**. The fact that opinion polls do their best to destroy the political as will and representation, the political as meaning, precisely through the effect of simulation and uncertainty, this fact can only give pleasure to the ironic unconscious of the masses (and to our individual political unconscious, if I may use this expression), whose deepest drive remains the symbolic murder of the political class, the symbolic murder of political reality-and this murder is produced by opinion polls in their own way. That is why I wrote in Silent Majorities that the masses, which have always provided an alibi for political representation, take their revenge by allowing themselves the theatrical representation of the political scene.3 The people have become public. They even allow themselves the luxury of enjoying day by day, as in a home cinema, the fluctuations of their own opinion in the daily reading of the opinion polls.

#### This is true at a fundamental and ontological level

**Paterson 3** Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Choice is key --- they are serial killers

**Paterson 3** Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable, precisely to the extent that he or she values it. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — friendships, family, life goals, etc. — which are subjected to de facto self-assessment for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

**Should avoid preventable death – contemplating it gives meaning to our life**

**Kelsang 99**- internationally renowned teacher of Buddhism

Geshe, <http://dealingwithfear.org/fear-of-death.htm>

Preparing for Death Generally, our fear of death is an unhealthy and unrealistic fear-we don’t want to die, so we ignore the subject, deny it, or get morbidly obsessed by it and think that life is meaningless. However, right now we cannot do anything about dying, so there is no point fearing death itself. What kind of fear is useful? A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This “sense of danger” inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windscreen.We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tantric spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body. In Living Meaningfully, Dying Joyfully, Geshe Kelsang says: Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continually that we too must die. **Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our life wisely by developing the inner refuge of spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the sufferings of death and what lies beyond**. Moreover, when someone close to us is dying, such as a parent or friend, we shall be powerless to help them because we shall not know how; and we shall experience sadness and frustration at our inability to be of genuine help. Preparing for death is one of the kindest and wisest things we can do both for ourself and others.

## 1nr

### Agon

#### Productive agonism requires rules and constraints to measure the performance of contestants---simply throwing out the topic destroys the agon and is more founded in slave morality than our framework---only contestation based on respect for the institution that makes competition possible, i.e. the topic, creates good relationships between competitors and value to life---excluding their affirmative is the foundation of good agonism

Christa Davis Acampora 2, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College of the City University of New York, Fall 2002, “Of Dangerous Games and Dastardly Deeds,” International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3

The agonistic game is organized around the test of a specific quality the persons involved possess. When two runners compete, the quality tested is typically speed or endurance; when artists compete, it is creativity; craftsmen test their skills, etc.. The contest has a specific set of rules and criteria for determining (i.e., measuring) which person has excelled above the others in the relevant way. What is tested is a quality the individual competitors themselves possess; and external assistance is not permitted. (This is not to say that agonistic games occur only between individuals and that there can be no cooperative aspects of agonistic engagement. Clearly individuals can assert themselves and strive against other individuals within the context of a team competition, but groups can also work collectively to engage other groups agonistically. In those cases what is tested is the collective might, creativity, endurance, or organizational ability of the participating groups.) Ideally, agonistic endeavors draw out of the competitors the best performance of which they are capable. Although agonistic competition is sometimes viewed as a "zero-sum game," in which the winner takes all, in the cases that Nietzsche highlights as particularly productive agonistic institutions, all who participate are enhanced by their competition. Winning must be a significant goal of participation in agonistic contests, but it would seem that winning might be only one, and not necessarily the most important one, among many reasons to participate in such a competition. In his later writings, Nietzsche appears to be interested in thinking about how the structures of contests or struggles can facilitate different possibilities for competing well within them. In other words, he questions whether the structure of the game might limit the way in which one might be able to compete. His study of slavish morality illuminates well that concern. II. Dastardly Deeds The so-called "Good Eris," described in "Homer's Contest," supposedly allowed the unavoidable urge to strive for preeminence to find expression in perpetual competition in ancient Greek culture. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche seeks to critique Christianity for advocating a kind of altruism, or selflessness, that is essentially self-destructive, and for perverting the urge to struggle by transforming it into a desire for annihilation. Read in light of "Homer's Contest," Nietzsche's Genealogy enables us to better grasp his conception of the value of contest as a possible arena for the revaluation of values, and it advances an understanding of the distinctions Nietzsche draws between creative and destructive forms of contest and modes of competing within them. Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, a Streitschrift—a polemic, a writing that aims to provoke a certain kind of fighting—portrays a battle between "the two opposing values 'good and bad,' 'good and evil'." Nietzsche depicts slavish morality as that which condemns as evil what perpetuates the agon—namely, self-interest, jealousy, and the desire to legislate values— but rather than killing off the desire to struggle, slavish morality manipulates and redirects it. Prevention of struggle is considered by Nietzsche to be hostile to life: an "order thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power-complexes but as a means of preventing all struggle in general—... would be a principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness" (GM II:11). "The 'evolution' of a thing, a custom, an organ is [...] a succession of [...] more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions"(GM II:12). For Nietzsche, human beings, like nations, acquire their identity in their histories of struggles, accomplishments, and moments of resistance. The complete cessation of strife, for Nietzsche, robs a being of its activity, of its life. In the second essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche identifies the notion of conscience, which demands a kind of self-mortification, as an example of the kind of contest slavish morality seeks: "Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction—all this turned against the possessors of such instinct: that is the origin of the 'bad conscience'" (GM II:16). Denied all enemies and resistances, finding nothing and no one with whom to struggle except himself, the man of bad conscience: impatiently lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and maltreated himself; this animal that rubbed itself raw against the bars of its cage as one tried to 'tame' it; this deprived creature... had to turn himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness — this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner became the inventor of the 'bad conscience.' But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness... a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and terribleness had reached hitherto (GM II:16). Bad conscience functions in slavish morality as a means of self-flagellation, as a way to vent the desire to hurt others once external expressions of opposition are inhibited and forbidden. "Guilt before God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture to him" (GM II:22). In that case, self-worth depends upon the ability to injure and harm oneself, to apply the payment of selfmaltreatment to one's irreconcilable account with God. It is the effort expended in one's attempt to make the impossible repayment that determines one's worth. xi The genuine struggle, that which truly determines value for the ascetic ideal is one in which one destructively opposes oneself—one's value increases as one succeeds in annihilating oneself. Slavish morality is still driven by contest, but the mode of this contest is destructive. It mistakes self-inflicted suffering as a sign of strength. The ascetic ideal celebrates cruelty and torture—it revels in and sanctifies its own pain. It is a discord that wants to be discordant, that enjoys itself in this suffering and even grows more self-confident and triumphant the more its own presupposition, its physiological capacity for life decreases. 'Triumph in the ultimate agony': the ascetic ideal has always fought under this hyperbolic sign; in this enigma of seduction, in this image of torment and delight, it recognized its brightest light, its salvation, its ultimate victory (GM III:28). Slavish morality, particularly in the form of Pauline Christianity, redirects the competitive drive and whips into submission all outward expressions of strife by cultivating the desire to be "good" xii in which case being good amounts abandoning, as Nietzsche portrays it, both the structure of the contests he admired in "Homer's Contest" and the productive ways of competing within them. It does not merely redirect the goal of the contest (e.g., struggling for the glory of Christ rather than competing for the glory of Athens), rather how one competes well is also transformed (e.g., the "good fight" is conceived as tapping divine power to destroy worldly strongholds xiii rather than excelling them). In other words, the ethos of contest, the ethos of the agon is transformed in slavish morality. Xiv III. Dangerous Games Moralities effect contests in two ways: 1) they articulate a structure through which the meaning of human being (e.g., excellence, goodness, etc.) can be created and meted out, and 2) they simultaneously cultivate a commitment to a certain way of competing within those structures. By cultivating not only a desire to win but a desire to compete well (which includes respect for one's competitor and the institutions that sets forth the terms of the engagement), xv we can establish a culture capable of deriving our standards of excellence internally and of renewing and revaluing those standards according to changes in needs and interests of our communities. This is the legacy that Nietzsche strives to articulate in his "Homer's Contest," one that he intends his so-called "new nobility" to claim. If the life of slavish morality is characterized by actions of annihilation and cruelty, Nietzsche's alternative form of valuation is marked by its activity of surmounting what opposes, of overcoming opposition by rising above (erheben) what resists, of striving continually to rise above the form of life it has lived. As a form of spiritualized striving, self-overcoming, must, like Christian agony, be selfdirected; its aim is primarily resistance to and within oneself, but the agony—that is, the structure of that kind of painful struggle—differs both in how it orients its opposition and in how it pursues its goals . Self-overcoming does not aim at self-destruction but rather at selfexhaustion and self-surpassing. It strives not for annihilation but for transformation, and the method of doing so is the one most productive in the external contests of the ancient Greeks: the act of rising above. Self-overcoming asks us to seek hostility and enmity as effective means for summoning our powers of development. Others who pose as resistances, who challenge and test our strength, are to be earnestly sought and revered. That kind of reverence, Nietzsche claims, is what makes possible genuine relationships that enhance our lives. Such admiration and cultivation of opposition serve as "a bridge to love" (GM I:10) because they present a person with the opportunity to actively distinguish himself, to experience the joy and satisfaction that comes with what Nietzsche describes as "becoming what one is." xvi This, Nietzsche suggests, is what makes life worth living—it is what

permits us to realize a certain human freedom to be active participants in shaping our own lives. xvii Agonists, in the sense that Nietzsche has in mind, do not strive to win at all costs. Were that their chief or even highly prominent goal we would expect to see even the best contestants hiding from their serious challengers to their superiority or much more frequently resorting to cheating in order to win. Rather, agonists strive to claim maximal meaning for their actions. (That's the good of winning.) They want to perform in a superior manner, one that they certainly hope will excel that of their opponent. In other words, the best contestants have a foremost commitment to excellence, a disposition that includes being mindful of the structure through which their action might have any meaning at all—the rules of the contest or game.xviii What makes this contest dangerous? xix To be engaged in the process of overcoming, as Nietzsche describes it, is to be willing to risk oneself, to be willing to risk what one has been— the meaning of what one is—in the process of creating and realizing a possible future. The outcome is not guaranteed, that a satisfactory or "better" set of meanings and values will result is not certain. And when the contest is one in which rights to authority are in play, even the Nietzschean contest always runs the risk of supporting tyranny—of supplying the means by which the tyrannical takes its hold. Nietzsche is, of course, mindful of this danger, which is why in his account of the Greek agon he finds it important to discuss the alleged origin of ostracism as the mechanism for preserving the openness of contest. xx Nietzsche claims agonistic institutions contribute to the health of individuals and the culture in which these institutions are organized because agon provides the means for attaining personal distinction and for creating shared goals and interests. Pursuit of this activity, Nietzsche claims, is meaningful freedom. Late in his career, Nietzsche writes, "How is freedom measured in individuals and peoples? According to the resistance which must be overcome, according to the exertion required, to remain to top. The highest type of free men should be sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome: five steps from tyranny, close to the threshold of the danger of servitude" (TI, "Skirmishes," 38). Nietzsche believes that it is only when our strength is tested that it will develop. Later in the passage just cited, Nietzsche continues, "Danger alone acquaints us with our own resources, our virtues, our armor and weapons, our spirit, and forces us to be strong. First principle: one must need to strong—otherwise one will never become strong" (TI, "Skirmishes," 38). Nietzsche takes upon himself, in his own writing, the task of making these kinds of challenges for his readers. Nietzsche's critiques of liberal institutions, democracy, feminism, and socialism should be read in the context of his conception of human freedom and the goal he takes for himself as a kind of liberator. Read thus, we could very well come to see the relevance of agonistic engagement as a means of pursuing a kind of democracy viewed not as a static preservation of some artificial and stultifying sense of equality, but as a process of pursuing meaningful liberty, mutual striving together in pursuit of freedom conceived not as freedom from the claims of each other but as the freedom of engagement in the process of creating ourselves. xxi IV. A Nietzschean ethos of agonism In a recent essay, Dana R. Villa examines the general thrust of arguments of those advocating agonistic politics. These "contemporary agonists," xxii he claims, largely look to Nietzsche and Foucault (cast as Nietzsche's heir, at least with regard to his conception of power and contest) for inspiration as they make their "battle cry of 'incessant contestation'," which is supposed to create the space a radical democratic politics. These theorists, remind us that the public sphere is as much a stage for conflict and expression as it is a set of procedures or institutions designed to preserve peace, promote fairness, or achieve consensus. They also (contra Rawls) insist that politics and culture form a continuum, where ultimate values are always already in play; where the content of basic rights and the purposes of political association are not the objects of a frictionless 'overlapping consensus' but are contested every day in a dizzying array of venues. xxiii Villa would commend them for this reminder, but he claims that "recent formulations of an agonistic politics […] have tended to celebrate conflict, and individual and group expression, a bit too unselectively". xxiv He argues that "Nietzsche-inspired" agonists would do better to look to Arendt's conception of the agon and its place in political life for pursuing democratic aims, because she stipulates "that action and contestation must be informed by both judgment and a sense of the public if they are to be praiseworthy. The mere expression of energy in the form of political commitment fails to impress her." "'Incessant contestation,' like Foucauldian 'resistance,' is essentially reactive." What such a politics boils down to is "merely fighting"; so conceived, "politics is simply conflict". xxv Placing the expression of energies of the individual, multiplicities of selves, or groups at the center of an agonistic politics that lacks some aim beyond just fighting does not advance the aims of democracy. Without specifying an agonistic ethos that crafts a sense of "care for the world—a care for the public realm," politics as the socalled "contemporary agonists" conceive it cannot be liberatory. Arendt, Villa argues, supplies such an ethos in a way that Nietzsche does not. My goal here has been to argue that Nietzsche does supply us with an agonistic ethos, that despite the fact that the advocates of "incessant contestation" might fail to distinguish agonistic conflict from "mere fighting" or "simply conflict" Nietzsche does. My aim is more than mere point-scoring. I am not interested in supporting a case that Nietzsche's views are better than Arendt's. I do think Nietzsche's work offers conceptual resources useful for amplifying and clarifying agonistic theories that are pervasive in numerous fields, including political science, moral psychology, and literary criticism. If we are attentive to how Nietzsche distinguishes different kinds of contests and ways of striving within them we can construct an ethos of agonism that is potentially valuable not only for the cultivation of a few great men but which also contributes to the development of a vibrant culture. By way of concluding, I shall draw on the distinctions developed in Nietzsche's conception of agon and sketch the outlines of a productive ethos of agonism. Some competitions bring with them entitlements and rewards that are reserved for the sole winner. Nearly all of these can be described as zero-sum games: in order for someone to win, others must lose. Further, if I choose to help you to prepare your dossier for your promotion application for the only available post, I risk reducing my own chances for success. Let's call these kinds of competitions antagonistic ones, in which the competitors are pitted against each other in an environment hostile to cooperation. We can also imagine competitions that are not zero-sum games, in which there is not a limited number of resources. Such contests would allow us to enact some of the original meanings at the root of our words for competition and struggle. The Latin root of compete means "to meet," "to be fitting," and "to strive together toward." The Greek word for struggle, which also applied to games and competitions, is agon, which in its original use meant "gathering together." xxvi Practicing an agonistic model of competition could provide results of shared satisfaction and might enable us to transform competitions for fame and status that inform so much of our lives into competitions for meeting cooperatively and provisionally defined standards of aesthetic and intellectual excellence.xxvii If we can revive the sense of agon as a gathering together that vivifies the sense of competition that initiates a striving together toward, we can better appreciate the unique relational possibilities of competition. Recalling the definitions of agon and competition provided above, from which I tried to indicate a sense of competition that could facilitate a process of gathering to strive together toward, consider another example. When two runners compete in order to bring out the best performances in each, their own performances become inextricably linked. When I run with you, I push you to pull me, I leap ahead and call you to join me. When you run faster, I respond to your advance not by wishing you would run slower or that you might fall so that I could surge ahead. I do not view your success as a personal affront, rather I respond to it as a call to join you in the pursuit. When in the course of running with me, you draw from me the best of which I am capable, our performances serve as the measure of the strength in both of us. Neither achievement finds its meaning outside of the context in which we created it. When two (or more) compete in order to inspire each other, to strive together toward, the gathering they create, their agon, creates a space in which the meaning of their achievements are gathered. When your excellent performance draws mine out of me, together we potentially unlock the possibilities in each. For this we can certainly be deeply indebted to each other. At the same time, we come to understand and appreciate ourselves and our own possibilities in a new way. Furthermore, this way of coming to understand and appreciate our difference(s), and of recognizing perhaps their interdependence, might be preferable, to other ways in which differences might be determined. Although surely not appropriate in all circumstances, agonistic endeavors can provide an arena for devising a more flexible and creative way of measuring excellence than by comparison with some rigid and externally-imposed rule. xxviii Agonism is not the only productive way of relating to each other, and we can certainly play in ways that are not agonistic, but I do think such an ethos of agonism is compatible with recognition of both the vulnerability of the other and one's dependence upon others for one's own identity. It incorporates aggression, instructive resistance, as well as cooperation, and it is compatible with the practice of generosity. It cultivates senses of yearning and desire that do not necessarily have destructive ends. It requires us to conceive of liberation as something more than freedom from the constraints of others and the community, but as a kind of freedom— buttressed with active support—to be a participant in the definition and perpetual recreation of the values, beliefs, and practices of the communities of which one is a part. That participation might entail provisional restraints, limitations, and norms that mark out the arenas in which such recreations occur. At his best, I think Nietzsche envisions a similar form for the agonistic life. Competitive "striving together toward" can be a difficult condition to create and a fragile one to maintain. It requires the creation of a common ground from which participants can interact. It needs a clearly defined goal that is appropriately demanding of those who participate. It requires that the goal and the acceptable means of achieving it are cooperatively defined and clearly articulated, and yet it must allow for creativity within those rules. It demands systematic support to cultivate future participants. And it must have some kind of mechanism for keeping the competition open so that future play can be anticipated. When any one of the required elements is disrupted, the competition can deteriorate into alternative and non-productive modes of competition and destructive forms of striving. But when agonistic contest is realized, it creates enormous opportunities for creative self-expression, for the formation of individual and communal identity, for acquiring self-esteem and mutual admiration, and for achieving individual as well as corporate goals. It is one of the possibilities that lie not only beyond good and evil but also beyond the cowardly and barbarous.

### Galloway

#### they just flip the hierarchy and efface the neg

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon **an unstated rule** to **exclude the negative response**. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude **an entire range of negative arguments**, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” **fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way**. Ground is just that—**a ground to stand on**,

**a ground to speak from**, **a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation**.